



Overview of Societal Instability Events Involving Federal Government Actors across the State of Illinois from January 20, 2025 through May 1, 2026

Final Report to the Illinois Accountability Commission

Cline Center for Advanced Social Research
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

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Executive Summary

The Cline Center for Advanced Social Research at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign was asked by the Illinois Accountability Commission to document societal instability events consisting of protests, acts of political violence, and destabilizing governmental acts involving federal government actors that occurred across the state of Illinois from January 20, 2025 through May 1, 2026. This report summarizes key findings derived from a systematic analysis of journalistic reports published by credible news organizations that documented important aspects of federal government activity associated with what would culminate into the “Operation Midway Blitz” campaign, which began on September 8, 2025. Additional insights are provided with a separate analysis of publicly-available Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrest data covering the entire state of Illinois from January 1, 2024 through March 11, 2026.

This final report concludes an ongoing data collection project documenting these events across the state of Illinois from January 20, 2025 through May 1, 2026, and supersedes [the previously-released report on Operation Midway Blitz](#) that was released on April 3, 2026.

1. Findings about Destabilizing Governmental Acts Initiated by Federal Actors

1.1: News reports documented at least 859 destabilizing acts initiated by federal actors, including 608 events involving questionable arrests.



1.2: Federal law enforcement officials initiated most of the destabilizing governmental acts involving federal actors during Operation Midway Blitz.

1.3: Among federal law enforcement actors, ICE was the most frequent initiator of destabilizing governmental acts.

1.4: Federal actors used some kind of physical violence in 47.7% of destabilizing governmental acts.

1.5: The most common weapons used by federal actors were bodily force and chemical munitions.

1.6: The daily number of destabilizing governmental acts peaked in late October 2025.

1.7: Destabilizing acts by federal actors around the Chicagoland area were concentrated in Broadview and Cicero as well as neighborhoods of western and southern Chicago.

1.8: Destabilizing acts by federal actors occurred across the state.

1.9: Most destabilizing acts by federal actors happened in Cook County and the immediate collar counties.

2. Findings about Civilian-Initiated Events Targeting Federal Actors

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2.2: In the small number of political violence events against federal actors, bodily force, vehicles, and thrown objects were the most common weapons.

2.3: Protests and acts of political violence targeting federal actors peaked in late October 2025.

2.4: Protests and acts of political violence targeting federal actors in and around the Chicagoland area were concentrated in Broadview, in the Chicago Loop, and in the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago.

2.5: Protests occurred across the state, while political violence was centered in Chicagoland.

2.6: Most protest and political violence events targeting federal actors happened in Cook County.

3. Findings about ICE arrests across Illinois before, during, and after the onset of Operation Midway Blitz

3.1: Following a decline in 2024, Operation Midway Blitz marked the fourth ICE arrest surge in 2025.

3.2: The percentage of arrestees with one or more prior criminal convictions was lower during Operation Midway Blitz than at any period since the start of 2024.

3.3: As statewide daily arrests went up, the percentage of arrestees with criminal convictions went down.

1. Findings about Destabilizing Governmental Acts Initiated by Federal Actors

Destabilizing governmental acts are actions by government officials or institutions with potential to undermine public trust, disrupt normal civic life, weaken democratic processes, or increase social and political tensions. Some destabilizing governmental acts can involve extraordinary measures, such as declaring martial law, while others arise from routine government functions that are carried out in ways perceived as punitive, intimidating, discriminatory, or neglectful. This framework recognizes that societal instability can emerge not only from dramatic constitutional crises, but also from everyday governmental decisions and actions that affect citizens, communities, and institutions. The Cline Center's Firewatch Project documents two broad subtypes of destabilizing governmental acts (*extraordinary destabilizing governmental acts* and *ordinary destabilizing governmental acts*) that can be further divided into 11 subtype categories of extraordinary destabilizing governmental acts and 18 subtype categories of ordinary destabilizing governmental acts (see **Appendix** for details and definitions).

Finding 1.1: News reports documented at least 859 destabilizing acts initiated by federal actors, including 608 events involving questionable arrests.

News reports published across the period from January 20, 2025 through May 1, 2026 documented at least 859 destabilizing acts initiated by federal actors across the state of Illinois. As shown in **Figure 1.1**, 849 of these events were distributed across 17 subtype categories of ordinary destabilizing governmental acts, and another 10 events were distributed across four subtype categories of extraordinary destabilizing governmental acts.

In Figure 1.1, the top 17 categories consist of ordinary destabilizing governmental acts, starting with 608 instances of questionable arrest or detention and 426 events involving the public gathering of large numbers of law enforcement personnel in a single location. Short definitions for each subtype category can be found in the **Appendix**. The 10 instances of extraordinary destabilizing governmental acts appear in the four categories at the bottom of the list. Since these last four categories have more serious destabilization potential than the 17 categories that populate the higher bars in Figure 1.1, it is worth describing each of them before proceeding further in the analysis.

The first five of these events were all “extraordinary executive decrees” by the Trump Administration that affected the entire country along with Illinois. They include a [January 20, 2025 executive order seeking to end birthright citizenship](#); a [January 21, 2025 decision rescinding long-standing guidance that limited immigration enforcement](#) at schools, churches, hospitals, and other "sensitive locations"; a [January 24, 2025 announcement directing Immigration and Customs Enforcement \(ICE\) to rapidly expand deportations](#) by using expedited removal authority against migrants who had entered the United States under temporary humanitarian programs established during the Biden administration; [invoking the 1798 Alien Enemies Act on March 14, 2025](#) to deport more than 200 Venezuelan migrants allegedly affiliated with the Tren de Aragua gang to a high-security prison in El Salvador, and a [July 8, 2025 internal memorandum issued by Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons](#) that made mandatory detention its official policy for all individuals unlawfully present in the United States.

The sixth of these extraordinary events documented during Operation Midway Blitz involved President Trump’s October 4, 2025 announcement [federalizing the Illinois National Guard over the objections of Governor Pritzker](#). This extraordinary destabilization event was categorized as an act of “disrupting or usurping of lower level government authority”, which captures instances where one branch of government (in this case, President Trump representing the Executive Branch of the United States) ignores or otherwise overrides the sovereign authority of a lesser branch of government (in this case, Governor Pritzker representing the Executive Branch of the State of Illinois).




Figure 1.1 showing subtype characteristics for 859 destabilizing governmental acts by federal actors. Because single events can have multiple subtype characteristics, these bars add up to more than 100% of documented events.
Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

The seventh extraordinary event occurred on October 14, 2025 when [the U.S. Department of Justice ordered Facebook to remove a page for reporting ICE sightings](#) that had been widely used by Chicago-area residents. This extraordinary destabilization event was categorized as an act of “disrupting an apparatus of political expression/communication”, which captures instances where a government authority (in this case, the U.S. Department of Justice) issues a prior restraint or otherwise censors a channel of political communication that would ordinarily be protected from such action by the free speech protections of the U.S. constitution’s First Amendment.

The eighth extraordinary event also took place on October 14, 2025, when a federal judge who had issued a temporary restraining order limiting the use of force against peaceful protesters and journalists [questioned whether federal immigration agents were complying with the order](#) during subsequent enforcement operations in Chicago. This extraordinary destabilization event was categorized as an act of “disrupting co-equal branches of government”, which captures instances where one branch of government (in this case, agents of the Executive Branch) ignores or otherwise fails to comply with the authority of a co-equal branch of government (in this case, a judge representing the Judicial Branch).

The ninth occurred on October 23, 2025 when [federal agents used tear gas against protesters in violation of the terms of a court order](#) limiting the use of force. This extraordinary destabilization event was categorized as an act of “disrupting co-equal branches of government.”

The tenth extraordinary event documented during Operation Midway Blitz involved federal agents violating a court order on October 31, 2025. The *Chicago Sun-Times* reported that [several federal immigration agents failed to wear identifying information in violation of a judge's order](#) requiring agents to identify themselves. This extraordinary destabilization event was categorized as an act of “disrupting co-equal branches of government.”

Although appearing numerically at the bottom of Figure 1.1’s long list of destabilizing acts committed by federal actors before and during Operation Midway Blitz, these 10 are among the most historically significant instability events documented in this analysis.

Finding 1.2: Federal law enforcement officials initiated most of the destabilizing governmental acts involving federal actors during Operation Midway Blitz.

Nearly all of the 859 destabilizing acts initiated by federal actors before, during, and after Operation Midway Blitz were set into motion by law enforcement officials. **Figure 1.2** shows that 834 of these events (97.1%) were initiated at least in part by federal law enforcement officials. Another 10 events were initiated at least in part by members of the U.S. Armed Forces (1.1%), of which eight were initiated by members of the National Guard, one was initiated by a member of the Coast Guard, and one was initiated by military law enforcement personnel. The remaining categories in Figure 1.2 represent the smaller number of events initiated at least in part by other federal government personnel.




Figure 1.2 showing initiator subcategories associated with 859 destabilizing governmental acts by federal actors. Because one event can involve multiple initiator types, single events can be represented across more than one category.
Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 1.3: Among federal law enforcement actors, ICE was the most frequent initiator of destabilizing governmental acts.

Since nearly all federally-initiated instability events in the Illinois area before, during, and after Operation Midway Blitz involved law enforcement personnel, **Figure 1.3** shows a breakdown of law enforcement actor types across these 834 events. The two most prominent federal agencies in this list are ICE (associated by name with 70.7% of these events) and CBP (associated by name with 22.1% of these events). The second largest category in Figure 1.3 consists of generic references to federal police or law enforcement personnel without mentioning a specific agency, which often occurred when federal actors failed to clearly identify themselves. It is also notable that 16 events were initiated at least in part by sheriffs or deputies, who are local law enforcement officials but are counted as event initiators alongside federal agents when they conduct joint operations or otherwise engage civilians in the same events as federal actors. The appearance of non-federal actors in this list of federally-initiated destabilizing events suggests that at least some of the nondescript references to police or law enforcement personnel in these events could refer to non-federal officers or agencies. However, it is important to note that any destabilizing event initiated solely by non-federal law enforcement would not have been counted among the 834 events reported here. Each of these 834 events was initiated at least in part by what news reports describe as federal law enforcement officials.




Figure 1.3 showing initiator subcategories associated with 834 destabilizing governmental acts initiated by federal law enforcement actors. Because one event can involve multiple initiators, single events can be represented across more than one category.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 1.4: Federal actors used some kind of physical violence in 47.7% of destabilizing governmental acts.

Figure 1.4 shows that federal actors were described in news reports as using physical violence on at least 410 separate occasions between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026. With at least 859 destabilizing governmental acts by federal actors documented in news reports reviewed by Cline Center analysts, this means federal actors were described as using some sort of physical violence in 47.7% of those events. The Firewatch Project defines violence as *any unwanted physical contact by a person against another person or that person's property*. Within this definition, verbal or written threats are not considered acts of violence. Any use of a weapon is considered violent regardless of outcome, but merely brandishing or threatening to use a weapon is not considered an act of violence for purposes of documenting societal instability events.




Figure 1.4 showing for the 859 events initiated by federal actors, the number and percentage that used some kind of physical violence.
Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 1.5: The most common weapons used by federal actors were bodily force and chemical munitions.

News reports documenting the 410 destabilizing governmental acts that involved some form of physical violence often made reference to specific weapons used against civilians by the federal actors who initiated these events. **Figure 1.5** details the number of references to particular types of weapons used against civilians in this subset of events, with bodily force mentioned in 385 events and chemical device or munition deployments described in at least 73 separate events.




Figure 1.5 showing weapons use documented within the 410 destabilizing governmental acts in which some form of violence was used by federal actors. Because one event can involve multiple weapon types, single events can be represented across more than one category.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

These weapon types are defined as follows:

- *bodily force*: physical force using empty-handed pressure, control, or restraint tactics
- *chemical devices/munitions*: any pepper/OC spray, tear gas/CS, smoke munitions or related deployments
- *advanced less than lethal devices/munitions*: flash bang grenades, stingball grenades, taser, stun gun, sound, or microwave weapons
- *vehicles*: use of vehicle as a weapon
- *less than lethal blunt or projectile weapons*: rubber bullets, beanbag rounds, batons, etc.
- *crude blunt or sharp weapons*: clubs, baseball bats, axes, knives, chains, rope, whips, etc.
- *firearms*: improvised firearms, handguns, rifles, shotguns, submachine guns, light machine guns, etc.

- *military grade weapons*: crew-based machine guns, missiles, rockets, mortars, artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, attack helicopters, fighters/bombers, naval weapons, etc.
- *UAVs or drones*: use of weapons systems carried by UAVs or drones

Since news organizations prioritize reporting on novel and unusual details over frequent and common ones, it is important to note that mentions of particular weapon types in news reports should tend to become less frequent as the use of such weapons becomes more routine. Given the long duration of the most confrontational period during Operation Midway Blitz, the number of weapon deployments detailed in Figure 1.5 almost certainly understates the actual number of occasions when weapons of various kinds were used by federal actors during this period.

Finding 1.6: The daily number of destabilizing governmental acts peaked in late October 2025.

Figure 1.6 details the daily number of destabilizing governmental acts initiated by federal actors from January 20, 2025 through May 1, 2026. Day-to-day variance in event counts reveals a longer term increase in federal actor activity from early September until reaching a peak of 29 discrete Chicagoland events on October 24, 2025. After that point, federal-initiated destabilizing acts declined rapidly through early November before becoming sparse after mid-November other than a day with 23 events on December 16 and another with 13 events on December 17. The timing of this rapid decline and later sparseness coincides with the onset of two major DHS immigration operations in other states: [Operation Charlotte's Web targeting North Carolina that started on November 15](#), and [Operation Metro Surge targeting Minnesota that started on December 4](#). These large-scale immigrant arrest operations required large numbers of DHS personnel to implement, and it is plausible that the timing of these operations at least partly account for the reduced number of events in the Chicagoland area after early November.




Figure 1.6 showing daily counts of destabilizing acts initiated by federal actors.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 1.7: Destabilizing acts by federal actors around the Chicagoland area were concentrated in Broadview and Cicero as well as neighborhoods of western and southern Chicago.

Figure 1.7 shows the geographic distribution of the federally-initiated destabilizing acts that occurred in and around the Chicagoland area between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026. In this heatmap, the darkest shades of purple represent the smallest number of events, with yellow shading representing moderate numbers of events and the darkest shades of red representing the highest event counts. The inset area on the right of the figure shows a more fine-grained look at federally-initiated events that took place in the immediate vicinity of Cook County. Figure 1.7 reveals the widespread geographic impact of federally-initiated events in the northeastern part of the state before, during, and after Operation Midway Blitz: federally-initiated destabilizing acts were documented from near the Wisconsin border in the north to the cities of Joliet and Chicago Heights in the south, and from as far west as Dekalb to the eastern border with Indiana. Yet the main areas of geographic focus for these events were in Cicero, in Broadview—where a contested ICE facility was the site of a prolonged conflict between federal law enforcement and civilian protestors—as well as in Albany Park, Little Village, Back of the Yards, and other neighborhoods of western and southern Chicago.

Destabilizing Acts by Federal Actors around the Chicagoland Area Were Concentrated in Broadview and Cicero As Well As Neighborhoods of Western and Southern Chicago




Figure 1.7 showing the geographic distribution of destabilizing governmental acts initiated by federal actors in and around the Chicagoland area between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 1.8: Destabilizing acts by federal actors occurred across the state.

Figure 1.8 shows the counties that experienced at least one federally-initiated destabilizing act between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026. Of 102 counties in Illinois, 17 of them (16.7%) were the site of at least one destabilizing governmental act initiated by federal actors.

**Destabilizing Acts by Federal Actors
Occurred Across the State**

Counties with at Least One
Destabilizing Governmental Act




Figure 1.8 showing the geographic distribution of destabilizing governmental acts initiated by federal actors between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 1.9: Most destabilizing acts by federal actors happened in Cook County and the immediate collar counties.

Figure 1.9 shows the number of federally-initiated destabilizing acts by county that happened between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026. Cook County was the site for 688 of these events (80.1% of the total) followed by Lake (7.0%), Kane (5.2%), DuPage (3.0%), and Will County (1.6%), with the rest distributed broadly across the other 12 counties. Six of these destabilizing acts are omitted from this figure, because they were extraordinary events (the first six extraordinary events described in Finding 1.1) that originated outside Illinois with statewide impact.




Figure 2.6 showing the county-level distribution of destabilizing acts initiated by federal actors between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

2. Findings about Civilian-Initiated Events Targeting Federal Actors

In addition to documenting destabilizing acts initiated by governmental actors, the Cline Center's Firewatch Project also captures societal instability events initiated by civilian actors. These encompass actions undertaken by non-governmental actors to express political grievances, challenge existing policies or institutions, or pursue political objectives. These events range from peaceful forms of political expression—including demonstrations, symbolic acts, and public advocacy—to acts of political violence intended to cause harm to persons or property. Together, these categories capture the ways individuals and groups outside of government seek to influence public discourse, exert political pressure, advance ideological goals, or resist perceived injustices. These civilian-initiated instability events fall into two primary categories: **political expression events** with two broad subtypes (*symbolic expression events* and *mass political action events*) and **political violence events** with six broad subtypes (*attacks*, *riots*, *kidnappings*, *assassinations*, *suicide attacks*, and *armed actors seizing locations*). The **Appendix** contains additional details and definitions.

Finding 2.1: Peaceful protest was the norm for civilian-initiated events targeting federal actors.

News reports published across Illinois from January 20, 2025 through May 1, 2026 documented at least 345 societal instability events initiated by civilians and targeting federal actors. As shown in **Figure 2.1**, most of the 345 events documented in news reports were nonviolent, with 90.1% consisting of political expression events that were peaceful in nature. It is important to note that because news reports emphasize the novel and unexpected over the routine and predictable, civilian-initiated instability events that take place at the same location over long periods of time are likely to be underreported after their early novelty wears off. For this reason, it is almost certainly the case that the 345 distinctive civilian-initiated events captured in news reports is an undercount, particularly for locations with frequent numbers of these events such as the Broadview ICE facility.

Another 34 civilian-initiated events targeting federal actors (9.9%) were small-scale acts of political violence falling into the “attack” subtype with 22 directed at ICE officers, 15 at non-specified officers or agencies, 13 at CBP officers, six at DHS agents, one at DEA agents, one targeting a government official, and one targeting a notable civilian leader. No larger-scale acts of political violence (such as riots) or more organized forms of political violence (such as armed actors seizing locations) were reported anywhere in the state of Illinois area during the study period.




Figure 2.1 showing for the 345 events initiated by civilian actors, the number and percentage that used some kind of physical violence.
Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 2.2: In the small number of political violence events against federal actors, bodily force, vehicles, and thrown objects were the most common weapons.

News reports documenting the 34 events in which civilians used violence against federal actors also referenced specific types of weapons used in these incidents. **Figure 2.2** details the number of references to particular types of weapons used by civilians against federal actors in this subset of events. Bodily force along with vehicles as well as crude thrown weapons like snowballs, bottles, or rocks were the most common weapons mentioned in these reports.




Figure 2.2 showing weapons use documented within the 34 political violence events in which some form of violence was used by civilians against federal actors. Because one event can involve multiple weapon types, single events can be represented across more than one category.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

These weapon types are defined as follows:

- *bodily force*: physical force using empty-handed pressure, control, or restraint tactics
- *vehicles*: use of vehicle as a weapon
- *crude thrown or projectile weapons*: snowballs, rocks, bricks, bottles, bows, crossbows, slingshot, etc.
- *crude blunt or sharp weapons*: clubs, baseball bats, axes, knives, chains, rope, whips, etc.
- *crude explosives or incendiary devices*: fireworks, pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, IEDs
- *chemical devices/munitions*: any pepper/OC spray, tear gas/CS, smoke munitions or related deployments
- *firearms*: improvised firearms, handguns, rifles, shotguns, submachine guns, light machine guns, etc.

Finding 2.3: Protests and acts of political violence targeting federal actors peaked in late October 2025.

Figure 2.3 details the daily number of protests and acts of political violence targeting federal actors between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026. Day-to-day variance in event counts follows the general pattern in federally-initiated events shown in Figure 1.6 with increases from early September until peaking in mid-October and declines over the first few weeks of November. “No Kings” protests across the state produced noticeable spikes in civilian-initiated demonstrations specifically addressing immigration on June 14, 2025, October 18, 2025, and March 28, 2026.




Figure 2.3 showing daily counts of protests and acts of political violence targeting federal actors.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 2.4: Protests and acts of political violence targeting federal actors in and around the Chicagoland area were concentrated in Broadview, in the Chicago Loop, and in the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago.

Although Figure 2.3 confirmed that civilian-initiated events targeting federal actors followed the general tempo and intensity of federally-initiated events, **Figure 2.4** shows that the geographic distribution of civilian-initiated events in and around the Chicagoland area was relatively concentrated in Broadview, in the Chicago Loop, and in the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago. For reasons explained earlier the reliance of this analysis on news-reported protest descriptions will tend to undercount protest events that happen at the same location over a long period. For example, a separate analysis of protest events at the Broadview ICE facility reported in the **Appendix** shows that local news reports documented specific protest actions at Broadview on only 49 out of 152 possible days in the period considered here. As it is possible that protestors were on site outside the Broadview ICE facility nearly every day during Operation Midway Blitz, it is likely that a fuller accounting of protest activity than is possible with news-reported data would show the Chicagoland epicenter of civilian-initiated instability events to be the street areas outside 1930 Beach Street in Broadview.




Figure 2.4 showing the geographic distribution of societal instability events targeting federal actors and initiated by civilians in and around the Chicagoland area between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 2.5: Protests occurred across the state, while political violence was centered in Chicagoland.

Figure 2.5 shows the counties that experienced at least one act of protest or political violence initiated by civilian actors and targeting federal actors between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026. Of 102 counties in Illinois, 17 of them (16.7%) were the site of at least one protest event and 5 (4.9%) experienced at least one political violence event.




Figure 2.5 showing the geographic distribution of protest and political violence events targeting federal actors between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Finding 2.6: Most protest and political violence events targeting federal actors happened in Cook County.

Figure 2.6 shows the number of protest and political violence events initiated by civilian actors and targeting federal actors by county that happened between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026. Cook County was the site of 243 protest events (78.1% of the total) and 27 political violence events (79.4% of the total), with the rest distributed broadly across the other 16 counties.




Figure 2.6 showing the county-level distribution of protest and political violence events targeting federal actors between January 20, 2025 and May 1, 2026.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

3. Findings about ICE Arrests Across Illinois Before, During, and After the Onset of Operation Midway Blitz

Data documenting the tempo and intensity of federal law enforcement activities across the state of Illinois provide important background for contextualizing the events that took place in Chicagoland during Operation Midway Blitz. The Cline Center team analyzed ICE administrative arrest data distributed by the [Deportation Data Project](#), a team of academics and lawyers led by Graeme Blair, David Hausman, and Amber Qureshi that obtains and publishes authoritative governmental data obtained through open-records requests. These arrest data were compiled internally by ICE and were later obtained by the Deportation Data Project through a Freedom of Information Act request. As noted in the [Deportation Data Project's codebook](#), the administrative arrest dataset “records every time ICE arrests someone, whether or not that arrest results in a decision to detain the person.” The Cline Center’s analysis focused on the 8,234 ICE arrests that occurred within the state of Illinois between January 1, 2024 and March 11, 2026. Note that these data cover only arrests by ICE, and do not include any additional arrests by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) or other federal law enforcement agencies that might have occurred as part of Operation Midway Blitz.

Finding 3.1: Following a decline in 2024, Operation Midway Blitz marked the fourth ICE arrest surge in 2025.

Figure 3.1 shows longer-term trends in ICE arrests across the state of Illinois from January 1, 2024 through March 11, 2026. To simplify trend interpretation, this figure displays daily arrest numbers as blue bars and a 7-day moving average orange trendline for those daily arrest numbers, where each value represents the preceding seven days leading up to and including the displayed date.

From January 1, 2024 through January 19, 2025, ICE arrested an average of 4.3 persons per day across the state of Illinois. In the period from President Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2025 through the start of Operation Midway Blitz on September 8, 2025, ICE arrested an average of 8.2 persons per day across the state. Operation Midway Blitz was announced on September 8 and the largest surge of ICE arrests began on September 9 before falling sharply after November 8. This primary surge period lasted 62 days and produced 3,393 total arrests at an average of 54.7 arrests per day. The remaining 83 days in the series (November 9, 2025 through March 11, 2026) saw 1,273 total ICE arrests at an average of 10.3 arrests per day.

Although ICE operations during the fall of 2025 attracted widespread attention across the nation, Figure 3.1 shows that daily ICE arrests across Illinois surged during four additional periods in 2025 besides the start of Operation Midway Blitz. The first was a six-day period from January 26 through January 31 with 122 total arrests statewide. The second was an 11-day period from May 19 through May 29 with 181 arrests, and the third came shortly after in a 19-day period from June 2 through June 20 with 335 arrests. The fourth surge covered the first 62 days of Operation Midway Blitz discussed above, and a fifth and final surge in 2025 occurred over five days from December 15 through December 19 with an additional 147 arrests statewide.




Figure 3.1 showing ICE administrative arrest records from January 1, 2024 through March 11, 2026 analyzed by the Cline Center.

Source: Deportation Data Project

Finding 3.2: The percentage of arrestees with one or more prior criminal convictions was lower during Operation Midway Blitz than at any period since the start of 2024.

The ICE arrest dataset obtained by the Deportation Data Project contains numerous details about each arrestee, including whether they had been previously convicted of a crime (without specifying what that crime might have been), charged with a crime but not convicted, or not previously charged with a crime at the time of their arrest. **Figure 3.2** shows the percentage of ICE arrestees in each of these categories across three different periods. From January 1, 2024 to January 19, 2025, 43% of the 1,663 persons arrested by ICE agents anywhere in Illinois had at least one prior criminal conviction, and another 10% had been charged with some kind of misdemeanor or felony crime but not convicted. Another 1,911 persons were arrested by ICE between January 20, 2025 (the date of President Trump’s inauguration) through the starting day of Operation Midway Blitz on September 8, 2025, and the percentage with criminal convictions within that group held steady at 39% while the number charged with any crime but not convicted nearly doubled to 18%. In contrast, among the 4,660 persons arrested by ICE during the 184 days during and after Operation Midway Blitz covered by these data, only 18% had any kind of criminal conviction, with another 23% having been charged with a misdemeanor or felony but not convicted.




Figure 3.2 showing ICE administrative arrest records from January 1, 2024 through March 11, 2026 analyzed by the Cline Center.

Source: Deportation Data Project

In short, persons arrested by ICE agents during and after Operation Midway Blitz were far less likely to have been convicted of any kind of crime than for any period since the start of 2024. Among those arrested by ICE anywhere within Illinois during or after the Operation Midway Blitz period, 82% had no

prior criminal conviction of any kind, and 59% hadn't even been charged with a crime before the time of their arrest.

Finding 3.3: As statewide daily arrests went up, the percentage of arrestees with criminal convictions went down.

For the period from January 1, 2025 through March 11, 2026, **Figure 3.3** shows blue bars marking the seven-day moving average of the percentage of arrestees who had a prior criminal conviction of any sort, and an orange line marking the seven-day moving average of daily ICE arrests statewide. Figure 3.3 makes clear that as the daily number of ICE arrests went up, the percentage of those arrested who had been convicted of any crime went down.




Figure 3.3 showing ICE administrative arrest records from January 1, 2025 through March 11, 2026 analyzed by the Cline Center.

Source: *Deportation Data Project*

4. Methodology and Data Sources Used in This Report

The societal instability events documented in this report were extracted from public reports published by authoritative sources. A hybrid system was implemented in which computational Natural Language Processing methods were used to extract event features, providing structured support to highly trained human analysts responsible for producing reliable event records. News reports from authoritative journalistic organizations were the primary source of event-relevant information for this report.

What Is A Societal Instability Event?

The basic unit of analysis for this report is a societal instability event (“event” for short) that has the following characteristics:

1. Is human-initiated and at least potentially intentional (so by this definition accidents, acts of negligence, and acts of nature are not considered “events”).
2. Occurs during a specific single day or continuously across two or more specific consecutive days (so by this definition, discrete events occurring on consecutive days are considered separate events).
3. Occurs either at a known location within the state of Illinois or outside state boundaries but with a direct impact on the state of Illinois.
4. Falls within one of the three primary event types.

The three primary event types consist of political expression events, political violence events, and destabilizing governmental acts (for details on primary types, subtypes, and subtype categories, see the detailed ontology offered in the **Appendix**).

- **Political Expression (PE) events** are specific non-violent actions taken by non-government initiators that convey an anti(pro)-governmental, anti(pro)-status quo, political, economic, or social opinion taking the form of mass political actions involving large numbers of persons or symbolic expressions involving small groups or individual persons.
- **Political Violence (PV) events** are specific violent acts committed by non-governmental initiators against persons and/or property for the purpose of conveying an anti(pro)-governmental, anti(pro)-status quo, political, economic, or social opinion. These acts are different from traditional forms of criminal violence in that they ultimately seek to promote or defend a political position rather than to simply satisfy a material need or settle a personal vendetta. For purposes of this event type, **violence** is defined as *any unwanted physical contact by a person against another person or another person’s property*. Any use of a weapon is categorized as violence regardless of outcome. In contrast, making verbal threats or brandishing without attempting to use a weapon is not considered violence for purposes of this event category.
- **Destabilizing Governmental Acts (DGAs)** are specific acts committed by governmental actors with potential to provoke concern that the government is acting outside of ethical, moral, or lawful bounds. These acts may be violent or nonviolent in nature, and can be further subdivided into ordinary destabilizing governmental acts (acts by a unit of local, state, or national government

that evince potential for favoritism, vindictiveness, disdain, or some other abuse of discretion suggesting that the act is not a good-faith execution of state power) and extraordinary destabilizing governmental acts (acts by a unit of local, state, or national government that are credibly illegal, extra-legal, or capricious).

Each event is categorized within one (and only one) of the three primary event types and can then be further categorized into a single subtype along with one or more subtype categories (see **Appendix** for complete ontology description listing primary event types, subtypes, and subtype categories). One event can be assigned multiple subtype categories—reflecting the complex nature of societal instability incidents—but will only be assigned a single primary type and a single subtype.

When a complex event description offered by a news report indicates more than one type of primary event or more than one subtype within a primary event category, those instances will be categorized as separate events. For example, if a single news report detailed an amassing of ICE agents in a neighborhood and also detailed a protest against ICE that occurred on the same day in the same neighborhood, these would count as two separate events: one for the amassing of ICE agents and one for the protest.

Different instances of the same primary event type occurring on the same specific day and the same specific location are considered features of a single complex event that is bounded within a single day. For example, if a single news report describes a particular intersection as the location for one protest in the morning, another in the afternoon, and a third in the evening of the same day, these descriptions would be combined to form a single political expression event record for that particular location and that particular date.

The event ontology used in this report has been carefully designed to yield records that classify complex events as single records of a particular type of event, even in cases where a societal instability event has multiple distinctive features. For example, take a hypothetical case where a large group of ICE agents wearing unmarked police vests threatened bystanders with violence and ended up arresting but then releasing multiple civilians who were merely recording ICE activities on cell phones. This example would be documented with a primary type of “destabilizing governmental act” and a subtype of “ordinary” along with all of the following subtype categories: threatening to use violence, amassing law enforcement, failure to identify as law enforcement or obscuring affiliation, and questionable arrest or detention.

A single news report may describe zero events, one event, or multiple events. Within a single news report, multiple distinct references to, mentions of, or details about the same primary event are integrated into a single event description, so that separate references to the same event are not counted as different events when they occur within the context of a single news report. In contrast, descriptions of multiple primary events within a single news report are counted as different events, as when a single report describes multiple instances of the same type of primary event that occur in different locations or on different days, or when a single report describes different types of primary event that occur in the same location on the same day.

Originating Sources of Event Descriptions Reviewed for this Analysis

Local and hyperlocal news organizations serving the state of Illinois were the primary sources of information for this study. To find these reports, Cline Center analysts carried out a detailed analysis of the local news ecosystem serving Illinois and focused on extracting information from those sources that produced extensive daily amounts of news coverage focusing on the local region. We evaluated a wide variety of professionally-produced news sources that (1) have a specific focus on areas within Illinois, (2) covered the actions of government actors before, during and after Operation Midway Blitz, and (3) routinely included highly specific address or intersection-level information about these actions. Additionally, valid news sources for this project were required to have a search function, minimally restrictive paywall systems, and an ability to examine their historical archives.

During this analysis of the local news ecosystem, Cline Center analysts experienced three complications in finding relevant news stories. Many news sites lacked ways to search or otherwise access previously-published articles. Some news sites provided limited access to their full archive of news reports (e.g., stop providing results after a number of articles or pages had been reviewed). In addition, while there was a great variety of news sources reporting on Chicago and its immediately adjacent counties, analysts encountered more limited coverage of the outer suburbs and more remote counties outside the Chicagoland area. Together, these complications limited the Cline Center's ability to gather the fullest possible corpus.

Within each news organization's public-facing web pages, analysts conducted an initial search for relevant content to find news reports containing the word "immigration". For sources that produced significant amounts of daily news content, this search was used along with a date restriction of Jan 20, 2025 to the present. As might be expected, searches using a single keyword like "immigration" turned up a range of relevant and irrelevant story types that covered diverse topics including enforcement actions, executive announcements, protests related to immigration, legislation, etc. For smaller publications with fewer news reports, a more focused search was used in addition to a keyword search on "immigration". In such cases analysts also reviewed all published content for the examined time period to identify all news reports that mentioned immigration themes even if the word "immigration" was not present in an article.

In addition to news reports identified through this in-house search effort, the Cline Center team also reviewed additional news reports identified by the Illinois Accountability Commission as potentially containing descriptions of relevant events.

This first-stage review identified a total of 2,396 reports from 87 news organizations that were further assessed in a second-stage review to assess story relevance. **Figure 4.1** summarizes article counts from the top 25 news organizations contributing to these reports. These 2,396 reports consisted exclusively of textual descriptions: reports of potentially relevant events that originated on social media or that were only available in non-text forms (e.g., video, image, or audio) were excluded from the analysis.

A second-stage review consisted of full-text reading by human analysts who classified stories from the first-stage review as either relevant or irrelevant for containing descriptions of incidents meeting project

definitional criteria for societal instability events. Out of 2,396 news reports identified in the first-stage review, 1,507 (62.9%) were found to contain valid descriptions of relevant societal instability events and another 889 (37.1%) were found to contain no relevant event descriptions.




Figure 4.1 showing the distribution of news reports reviewed for this analysis across the top 25 originating news organizations.

Source: Cline Center Firewatch Project

Analyst Extraction of Event Details

Each of the 1,507 news reports identified as relevant for containing descriptions of societal instability events were then sent to a team of analysts who identified specific events and extracted all event details reported in this analysis. All event records extracted from news reports were documented at the “city-day” level or better (meaning a particular kind of event happened in a specific municipal location on a specific date). Whenever possible, highly specific location information was also extracted for each event when such information was provided in news descriptions.

Consolidating and Deduplicating Event Records

Once event records were extracted from news reports, those records were passed into a next-stage assessment to identify whether and when multiple event records sourced from different news reports might be describing the same event. Since individual analysts were assigned to read one news report at a time, there was no ability at the initial event extraction stage to identify whether the particular event being extracted from a news report had also been previously captured in a different analyst's extraction work using a different news report. If multiple independent reports of the same event were compiled into the final event database, any resulting event counts or event feature descriptions reported from such an analysis would be inflated by (potentially many) cases where multiple news reports described the same event.

To address this problem, Cline Center data scientists developed an elaborate system to cluster separate records of the same event for de-duplication using an event's primary type, specific location, and specific date as well as other extracted features. The first stage of the de-duplication process involved analysts reviewing event records by type, location, and date in ways that identified potential duplicate records of the same event. Analysts carefully reviewed date and location information to ensure it was entered correctly for later machine analysis and then provisionally clustered seemingly identical references to the same event. Using close inspection of highly detailed location information (e.g., distinguishing between an event that happened on 3rd and Kedzie and another that happened on 5th and Kedzie as unique events), analysts also reviewed annotations describing each incident to assess whether a given pair of seemingly similar event records were described in news reports differently from one another, had subtly different time or location elements, involved different numbers of reportedly involved individuals. On the basis of this first stage analysis, some events were marked as unique and others were marked as duplicates.

This marked set of event records was then sent through a second-stage analysis using computational methods to further refine and identify potential duplicate event descriptions. In this second stage, data scientists first standardized location references to ensure consistency across event records, focusing on specific locations associated with each event (e.g., street addresses and intersections). They then geocoded the cleaned location data using a combination of GeoNames, Google Maps, and ArcGIS queries that combined the specific location, city, and state to provide precise latitude and longitude coordinates for event clustering.

After the geocoding process was complete, data scientists used the refined latitude and longitude coordinates to cluster events by event type, date, and highly specific location. The team tested multiple distance thresholds for identifying separate event clusters and found that a radius of 0.6 miles around a given pinpoint location produced the most reliable results. This threshold intentionally over-cludes events within clusters, as it is easier to split clusters later than to merge them. Events were also grouped into clusters when there was overlap in location descriptions.

These initial machine-defined clusters were displayed in a Tableau dashboard and reviewed by human analysts using high-resolution event maps to determine whether particular clusters should be split or

merged based on a close analysis of event details. The process involved two rounds: an initial review to identify and flag potential adjustments and ambiguous cases, followed by a second review to confirm decisions and resolve uncertainties. Final determinations were recorded through a custom web application integrated with the dashboard. This process produced a final dataset of 859 destabilizing governmental acts initiated by federal actors and 345 societal instability events initiated by civilians analyzed in this report.

Since the average event cluster contained 2.81 separate event records, this deduplication process produced significant acuity gains in deduplicating redundant records of the same event that would have otherwise been reported as separate events. While 798 of 1,204 final event clusters were extracted from a single news report, the remaining 406 event clusters contained anywhere from two to 78 independently-reported event records.

Having passed through this rigorous consolidation and de-duplication process, the resulting event records not only reduce the potential for inaccurately inflated counts of events and event features, but also create a more reliable rendering of the temporal distribution of events by consolidating reported events sharing identical features that occurred within 0.6 miles of one another. While this approach risks conflating separating events into a single record, its advantage lies in effectively countering the sometimes vague intersection and block location details that happened to be described in slightly dissimilar ways across different news reports of the same event. The end result is that events of the same primary type that occurred on the same day generally will be counted as occurring in the same location if the location descriptions across different news reports are within 0.6 miles of each other. Further analyst review was then used to adjust those computational matches (as appropriate) based on additional contextual information about the involved event clusters.

Advantages and Limitations of Event Data Extracted From News Reports

There are several advantages as well as some important limitations for event data that is extracted from local news reports rather than from social media posts or other potential information sources. On the advantage side, professionally produced news reports go through fact-checking and editorial vetting processes that increase the chances specific facts mentioned in these accounts will be accurate and valid. News organizations are in the business of reporting on societal instability events, and their reputations will suffer if their reporting is not consistently accurate and trustworthy. In contrast, while social media posts often mention similar events, it is often difficult to verify whether the event in question actually occurred in the time and place in which it is alleged to, and there are additional challenges with AI-generated image or video information that purport to document events which never actually happened.

The main limitations with news-extracted event records have to do with the resource constraints that journalistic organizations operate under, which limits their ability to assign reporters to all relevant events or areas of interest. Especially when the number or variety of newsworthy events exceeds the reporting capacity of resource-strapped newsrooms, journalists will often focus on only the most newsworthy and dramatic events because it is assumed they will be of greater interest to news audiences, even though this leaves other similar events un- or under-reported.

An additional set of limitations has to do with the tendency for reporters to focus on novel, dramatic, and unexpected events over routine, calm, and predictable ones. This tendency for journalists to select the most novel stories can lead to significant underreporting of societal unrest events that occur repeatedly in the same place over a long span of time unless something happens to suddenly draw news attention back, often an act of violence or some sort of dramatic conflict. This can lead news reporting to create a partial and intermittent record of societal instability events targeting a single location or organization or of the same variety.

One example of this tendency that is relevant to Operation Midway Blitz is the long-term protest activity that took place in and around the Broadview ICE facility across the months of September, October, and November. As detailed in **Figure 4.2**, the Cline Center’s Firewatch Project documented 49 days of protest activity at the Broadview ICE facility out of 152 possible days from September 1, 2025 to January 30, 2026. In contrast, the [Crowd Counting Consortium at Harvard University](#) reports 143 days of Broadview protest activity during the same period.




Figure 4.2 showing a comparison of civilian protest activity at the Broadview IL ICE facility recorded by the Crowd Counting Consortium and by the Cline Center’s Firewatch Project.

Sources: Cline Center Firewatch Project, Crowd Counting Consortium

Unlike Firewatch, the Crowd Counting Consortium event reporting draws from an extensive range of social media, video, and open-source intelligence sources along with traditional news reports. Because that consortium does not detail how its event records are collected or even list specific news or social media reports that were used to extract relevant event information, it is difficult to say on what basis they concluded that there were 143 days of protesting at that location. Some might consider a passing claim that “protesters have been on site for the last 30 days” as sufficient basis for attributing 30 separate

protest events, and if such casual mentions were used as authoritative information in the Cline Center's Firewatch Project it is possible that a larger number of protest events could be attributed on that basis. For better or worse, the Cline Center's more conservative approach requires a news report to credibly describe a relevant event that occurred on a specific day and at a specific place in order to qualify for an event record. In the case of the Broadview ICE facility protests, this approach finds specific descriptions for only 49 days with definite protest events at Broadview across the local news reports reviewed for this analysis.

Determining Which ICE Arrests Occurred in the State of Illinois

In the separate analysis of ICE arrest data obtained by the [Deportation Data Project](#), Cline Center analysts had to identify within a set of national arrest record data the subset of ICE arrests that occurred within the state of Illinois. This was done using a combination of data elements from the "ApprehensionState", "Apprehension AOR", and "ApprehensionSiteLandmark" fields. Any arrest record listing "ApprehensionState" as Illinois was included. However, inconsistencies in reporting practices across ICE field offices meant that this field was often blank and its missingness made it a less than ideal guide to arrest locations. When "ApprehensionState" was missing for a record, analysts selected records that listed "Apprehension AOR" as "Chicago Area of Responsibility" and listed one of the following locations in the "ApprehensionSiteLandmark" field:

- CAP-CARROLL COUNTY JAIL, IL
- CAP-DIXON CORRECTIONAL CENTER, IL STATE DOC
- CAP-PUTNAME COUNTY JAIL, IL
- CAP-STEPHENSON COUNTY JAIL, IL
- CAP-THOMSON CORRECTIONAL CENTER, IL STATE DOC
- CHI GENERAL AREA, NON-SPECIFIC
- CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
- CHICAGO O'HARE AIRPORT
- CHIFUGITIVE OPERATIONS
- DAVIESS COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
- FUGITIVE OPERATIONS ON STREET MADISON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
- FUGITIVE OPERATIONS ON STREET MONROE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
- RII GENERAL AREA, NON-SPECIFIC
- US DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN ILLINOIS (USMS, PROB)
- US PENITENTIARY THOMSON
- CAP-EAST MOLINE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, IL STATE DOC
- CAP-HILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, IL STATE DOC
- CAP-ILLINOIS RIVER CORRECTIONAL CENTER, IL STATE DOC

5. Appendix: Firewatch Societal Instability Event Ontology

Political Expression (PE) events: The public articulation by non-governmental actors of threatening or unwelcome political statements directed towards societal elites and/or governmental actors.

1. **Symbolic Expression** (with six subtype categories that can apply for a given event)
 - a. *Symbolic wearing/display*: wearing or personal display of patches, t-shirt icons/logos, costumes, other like items
 - b. *Symbolic throwing/burning/abuse*: symbolic throwing, burning, or abuse of pageantry items – specifically non-violent and non-damaging
 - c. *Disrespecting national symbols*: flag trampling, burning, and the like
 - d. *Passive resistance/blocking traffic/occupying property*: die-ins, laying limp, blocking roads, blocking entry or exit to structures without violence or armaments
 - e. *Self-harm*: injuring self, engaging in a hunger strike, self-immolation
 - f. *Refusal of service*: denying voluntary commercial services to members of a group or agency or voluntary closing of services to protest acts against the community
2. **Mass Political Action** (with four subtype categories that can apply for a given event; symbolic expression subtype categories are also used in mass political action events for additional description)
 - a. *Banners/signs/placards/petitions*: carrying/waving banners, signs, placards, petitions, or flags
 - b. *Chants/speeches/prayers*: chanting, making speeches or prayers in the midst of a large audience
 - c. *Marching/protesting/demonstrating*: <self explanatory>
 - d. *Walking out of school or workplace*: walking out of a school or a workplace in defiance of learning/working times

Political Violence (PV) events: Physical acts perpetrated by non-governmental actors for political reasons that are intended to damage the person or property of others.

1. **Attack**: any violent physical acts which do not meet the other political violence subtype definitions
2. **Riot**: a spontaneous widescale rampage on the scale of hundreds or thousands engaging in unplanned violent acts
3. **Kidnapping**: the forced abduction or sequestration of a person or persons
4. **Assassination**: the targeted killing of a political or civic leader or authority

5. ***Suicide attack***: any attack where the device used to attack others directly kills the user; differs from a suicidal end to an attack or “suicide by cop”
6. ***Armed actor seizing location***: an attack which involves the physical occupation and/or armed denial of entry by government actors for a specific location

Destabilizing Governmental Acts (DGAs): Extraordinary acts of government or ordinary governmental tasks executed or ordered by government actors in their official capacity – including the failure to perform routine duties—that have potential to produce societal instability.

1. ***Extraordinary Destabilizing Governmental Acts*** (with 11 subtype categories that can apply for a given event)
 - a. *Disrupting an apparatus of political expression/communication*: any government interference—whether legal (decrees), by threats, or physical (up to violent damaging acts)—of means of conveying political speech such as targeting a radio station or television program
 - b. *Banning or suspending a political or civil society group*: any government proclamation declaring a political party or civil society group illegal or otherwise interfering with their rights to carry out their functions (e.g., attempting to remove certain political parties from the ballot, freezing bank accounts of a social group)
 - c. *Declaring a state of emergency*: a governmental order or statement declaring an emergency of any sort
 - d. *Imposing a curfew*: a governmental order or statement imposing large scale access or movement restrictions on the general populace
 - e. *Imposing martial law*: a government order or statement ending civilian authority and proclaiming military authority over a populace, usually involving infringement or suspension of normal laws, civilian courts, and civil liberties
 - f. *Issuing an extraordinary executive decree*: a governmental order or proclamation from the executive branch (mayor, governor, president) that is identified as disruptive or destabilizing to members of civil society
 - g. *Dissolving/disrupting co-equal branches of government*: the extra-legal or unlawful circumventing or removing one or more checks from a co-equal branch of government (e.g., a president or governor shutting down a legislature)
 - h. *Disrupting or usurping power of lower-level governmental authority*: the extra-legal or unlawful circumventing or removal of lower level government authority (e.g., the removal of a state government official by the federal level government)
 - i. *Canceling/annulling/postponing an election*: postponing, canceling or changing the outcome of an election
 - j. *Suspending constitution in part or in whole*: suspending constitutional provisions
 - k. *Disappearing individuals using state authority*: when there is evidence of a person being arrested or detained by governing authorities but after a time

there is no record of their incarceration nor evidence of the person's continued custody; person is entirely unaccounted for and unreachable by those searching, including situations where a person was killed or died in custody and authorities are avoiding accountability

2. **Ordinary Destabilizing Governmental Acts** (with 18 subtype categories that can apply for a given event)
 - a. *Failure to act*: governmental response to a situation is denied or neglectful (e.g., failing to respond to emergencies in specific neighborhoods to punish or intimidate them)
 - b. *Warning of formal action*: government actors use threats of legal or other non-violent negative consequences to intimidate otherwise non-violent non-status quo actors and/or acts (e.g., a threat to designate peaceful protesters as domestic terrorists)
 - c. *Threatening to use violence*: government actors use threats of violence to intimidate (e.g., ICE agents threaten use of tear gas against non-violent protesters)
 - d. *Discharge of government workers/officials*: the firing or removal of government workers or officials with the purpose of quelling dissent over a controversial policy or governmental act, reprisal for failing to carry out a controversial order, or punishing perceived public opponents
 - e. *Amassing law enforcement*: gathering law enforcement in strength and numbers to intimidate at a public location, near specific people or establishments, or during specific events like elections
 - f. *Deploying armed forces*: domestically deploying members of one or more armed forces to a location as a show of force
 - g. *Using armed forces in routine law enforcement roles*: members of armed forces take on traditional law enforcement roles
 - h. *Failure to identify as law enforcement or obscuring affiliation*: individuals claiming to be law enforcement but failing to identify themselves as law enforcement and/or masking their identity
 - i. *Other abuse of policing power*: the use of unusual, confusing, or dangerous actions, or the inappropriate issuing of orders by law enforcement to initiate contact with or detain persons
 - j. *Questionable arrest or detention*: using powers of arrest or detention in ways that suggest intimidation or hostility towards specific groups of people beyond a public safety need
 - k. *Abuse of post-arrest legal discretion*: inappropriate use of legal or judicial discretion, such as filing extreme charges or opening investigations for the purpose of punishing or intimidating political or status quo opponents

- l. *Facility closures*: shuttering of public or private recreational, commercial, or industrial facilities to punish users or owners
- m. *Service suspensions*: ending or suspending public services in a specific location to punish specific persons or groups
- n. *Unwarranted restrictions on movement or access*: blocking roads, entrances, or exits of locations for the purposes of kettling protesters or intimidating individuals or establishments
- o. *Exiling or forced relocation of persons*: deportation or exiling of persons to non-origin locations or prisons as a punishment
- p. *Preemptive arresting of civil society members*: targeting and arresting non-violent groups prior to planned non-violent activity or gathering
- q. *Intrusion into homes, property, computer systems, privacy*: violating the residency and/or privacy rights of individuals to intimidate or punish
- r. *Confiscation of personal or private property*: entering personal or private property into government evidence or taking to intimidate or punish